İÇİNDEKİLER
 About The Author  5 Preface  7 1. SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS AND SUPPLY-SIDE FISCAL POLICY  15 I. INTRODUCTION  15 II. HISTORlCAL HERITAGE OF SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS  15 III. REDISCOVERY OF SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: CONCEPT AND FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTIONS  17 A. Concept  18 IV. THE KHALDUN-LAFFER EFFECT  19 A. The Uncertainties Of The KL Effect  21 B. Time Horizon and High Tax Dilemma  23 VI. CONCLUSION  25 References  27 2. LEVIATHAN, TAXES AND THE GEESE: (WHY DO WE NEED A TAX CONSTITUTION?)  29 I. INTRODUCTION  29 II. EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND TAX EXPLOITATION: WARNINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS FROM EARLY CENTURIES  30 III. THE CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND ITS DEFICIENCIES  31 IV. CONSTITITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND TAX CONSTITUTION PROPOSAL  34 V. TAX CONSTITUTION: PROCEDURAL AND QUANTITIVE RESTRAINTS ON TAXING POWER OF LEVIATHAN  36 VI. CONCLUSION  40 References  42 3. THE NEW CHANGE DYNAMICS AND THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD  45 I. INTRODUCTION  45 II. CHANGE DYNAMICS  60 IV. THREE IMPORTANT CHANGES FOR GOVERNMENT REFORM  60 V. REFORMING PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS  66 References  67 4. TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL STATE: EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE ACTIVITIES  71 I. INTRODUCTION  71 II. REFORM FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE  72 III. RESTRUCTURING OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMY AND OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  73 IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN EFECTIVE STATE  82 5. (IM)POSSIBILITY OF RATIONAL REGULATION  89 I. INTRODUCTION  89 II. THE CONCEPT AND THE TYPES OF REGULATION  90 III. THE RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT REGULATION  100 V. THE COSTS OF REGULATION  105 VI. IS GOVERNMENT REGULATION NECESSARY IN A MARKET ECONOMY?  108 VII. IS RATIONAL AND EFFICENT REGULATION POSSIBLE?  109 VIII. REGULATION BY COMMAND VERSUS REGULATION BY RULES  112 IX. CONCLUSION  115 References  118 6. IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN POLITICS  123 I. INTRODUCTION  123 II. THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENTAL FAILURE  123 III. IMPERFECT INFORMATION AS POLITICAL FAILURE  127 IV. REMEDIES FOR INFORMATIONAL INEFFICIENCIES  129 References  130 7. POLITICAL ETHICS AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION  131 I. INTRODUCTION  131 II. DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION  131 III. TYPES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION  133 A. Bribery  133 B. Extortion  135 C. Embezzlement and Peculation  135 D. Favoritism  135 E. Patronage  137 F. Pork-Barreling  137 G. Logrolling and Vote Buying  138 H. Lobbying  139 I. Rent Seeking  139 J. The Leakage of Public Secrets and Robbery  140 K. Suasion  141 L. Political Manipulation  144 IV. CONCLUSION  144 Suggestions For Reading  145 8. ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT: ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES  149 I. INTRODUCTION  149 II. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES  149 A. Education and Culture  149 B. Political Will and Effective Leadership  150 C. Democratization and Effective Civil Society  150 D. Restructuring and Downsizing of the State  151 E. Removing the Centralist and Bureaucratic Government Structure  152 F. Economic Constitution Reform  153 G. Law on Government Ethics  154 H. Transparency and Accountability  155 I. Effectiveness in Justice and Judicial Services  156 İ. Institutional Reform  156 J. Political Corruption Inspection Board  157 K. Establishment of Parliamentary Internal Party Democracy Monitoring Committee  157 L. Ombudsman System  158 M. Term Limitation  159 N. Regulation and Transparency in Campaign Finance  160 O. Removing the Political Immunity of Deputies  161 P. Declaration of Property  161 Q. Recommendation of Trustee Board  162 R. Auditing  162 S. Budget Reform  163 T. Tax Reform  164 U. Restructuring in Grant (Subsidy) Programs  164 V. Whistleblowing  166 W. Human Resources Management  166 Y. Aggravation of Penalties  167 Z. Effective Struggle Against Mafia and Gangs  168 III. CONCLUSION  168 Suggestions For Reading  169  |